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IS IT CONSTITUTIONAL AND WILL
IT BE EFFECTIVE? AN ANALYSIS
OF MANDATORY HIV TESTING OF
PREGNANT WOMEN
Dorian L. Edent
NOTHING EVOKES MORE SYMPATHY than the im-
age of an innocent baby afflicted with a terrible disease. How-
ever, each year thousands of babies are born with diseases that
could have been prevented. One such disease is HIV. This paper
will analyze the current debate over the constitutionality of
mandatory HIV testing of pregnant women. My argument is that
while the Supreme Court would find mandatory HIV testing of
pregnant women constitutional, mandatory testing is not the
most effective way to reduce perinatal transmission. The first
section is a brief overview of the history behind HIV. The sec-
ond section examines the maternal-fetal conflict and discusses
its impact on mandatory HIV testing. The third section exam-
ines the constitutional arguments in favor of and against man-
datory HIV testing. The fourth section discusses the endorse-
ments of and legislation requiring HIV testing of pregnant
women. The fifth section discusses mandatory treatment of
pregnant women as analogous to mandatory treatment of HIV-
positive pregnant women. Finally, the sixth section discusses
the policy implications of mandatory testing.
t J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 2002.
I would like to thank my husband and parents for listening to my endless talk
on this subject and my sister for answering my medical questions. I would also like to
thank Professor Sharona Hoffman for her help and guidance and the Health Matrix
staff for all their hard work.
1 Perinatal transmission occurs when a pregnant woman transmits a disease to
her fetus, either during pregnancy or immediately after birth. See STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1349 (27th ed. 2000).
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I. HISTORY OF HIV
The discovery of HIV in 1981 marked the beginning of a
better understanding of how this disease is spread.2 Then, in
1985, tests were developed to identify those who were infected
with HIV. As a result, the public began crying out for manda-
tory testing of the groups that initially seemed to be affected by
the disease, homosexuals and intravenous drug users.3 Debate
over mandatory testing was based on four underlying factual
assumptions that persisted until November 1994:4
1. HIV infection is incurable and fatal, and the only
thing the health care system can offer those infected
with the virus is counseling and medicine to slow the
inevitable, deteriorative process;
2. HIV is a virus transmitted by a limited number of
well-established, private, intimate and/or illegal behav-
iors;
3. The diagnostic test for HIV is good, but not perfect,
at identifying those who are infected and at excluding
those who are not infected;
4. HIV is a stigmatizing condition, and those who test
positive may experience negative consequences not only
in terms of health status, but also in terms of personal
and professional well-being. 5
Today, it is known that the disease is not limited to any
group and can attack a person regardless of sexual orientation,
age, race, or gender. Although still without a cure, the likeli-
hood of transmission can be reduced and the longevity of life
2 See Elizabeth B. Cooper, Why Mandatory HIV Testing of Pregnant Women
and Newborns Must Fail: A Legal, Historical, and Public Policy Analysis, 3
CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 13, 13 (1996) (indicating that gay men were the first popu-
lation in which HIV was recognized in the early 1980s).
3 See Michelle Oberman, Test Wars: Mandatory HIV Testing, Women, and
Their Children, 3 U. Cm. L. SCH. ROuNDTABLE 615, 616 (1996).
4 In November 1994, the AIDS Clinical Trial Group Protocol 076 was
stopped and the data was collected. The study demonstrated that AZT administered
during pregnancy reduced the perinatal transmission rate. See id. at 624.
5 Id. at 616 (citation omitted).
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can be increased with treatment. This knowledge, as well as the
fatality of the disease, has led to a resurgence of the call for
mandatory testing among various groups. The most recent group
to be targeted is pregnant women.
It is estimated that "four million women give birth each
year in the United States." 6 Of those infants born, 7,600 are to
HIV-infected women7 and approximately 26%, or 2,000 of
those born, acquire the virus from their mothers.8 Studies have
shown that the majority of the mothers become infected through
heterosexual contact or drug use. 9 Although clinical tests of
pregnant women began late, the AIDS Clinical Trials Group
("ACTG") Protocol 076 ("076 Study") showed that a regimen
of AZT during pregnancy, labor, and then administered to the
newly born infant, successfully reduced the risk of perinatal
HIV transmission.' 0 The 076 Study demonstrated a greater than
75 percent reduction in pediatric AIDS cases diagnosed in 1998
as compared to the peak incidence of pediatric AIDS cases di-
agnosed in 1992.11 New tests have demonstrated the perinatal
transmission rate with AZT treatment to be as low as three per-
cent. 12 These tests have led to considerable debate over whether
6 Evans McMillion, Note, The Case Against Mandatory HIV Testing of Preg-
nant Women: The Legal and Public Policy Implications, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
PoL'Y 227, 227 (1998) (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 74 tbl. 89 (117th ed. 1997)).
7 See Ann M. Buchanan, The Ethics of Mandatory Versus Voluntary HIV
Testing of Pregnant Women, 57 CURRENT SURGERY 166, 166 (2000).
8 See id.
9 See Committee on Pediatric AIDS, American Academy of Pediatrics, Iden-
tification and Care of HIV-Exposed and HIV-Infected Infants, Children, and Adoles-
cents in Foster Care, 106 PEDIATRICS 149, 149 (2000) (reporting HIV/AIDS epide-
miology of women). There are cases of children remaining asymptomatic after HIV-
infection, or having mild symptoms (such as anemia or developmental delay) until
about age four. There have been remarkable cases of children living to age fifteen,
despite perinatal transmission. See id. at 150.
SSee Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Revised U.S. Public Health
Service Recommendations for Human Immunodeficiency Virus Screening of Preg-
nant Woman, Oct. 20, 2000, at 1 (available at <http:llwww.cdc.govlhiv/frnl
perinatal.pdf>); see also McMillion, supra note 6, at 228 (citing Elizabeth B. Cooper,
Why Mandatory HIV Testing of Pregnant Women and Newborns Must Fail: A Legal,
Historical, and Public Policy Analysis, 3 CARDozo WOMEN'S L.J. 13, 19 n.32
(1996)).
11 See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 10.
12 See Health Care Financing Admin., Pregnancy and HIV: What Women and
Doctors Need to Know (visited Mar. 4,2001) <http://www.hcfa.gov/hiv/
default.htm>. Prenatal and postnatal care includes a regimen of AZT during preg-
nancy and a cesarean section instead of vaginal delivery. In addition, a shorter AZT
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HIV testing should be a mandatory part of a pregnant woman's
prenatal care.
H. THE MATERNAL-FETAL CONFLICT AND ITS
IMPACT ON MANDATORY HIV TESTING
The states have asserted an interest in protecting a viable
fetus. For example, the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld
the state's conviction of a pregnant woman who used illegal
drugs during her pregnancy based on its criminal child neglect
state statute. 13 The court determined that South Carolina law
"recognized that viable fetuses are persons holding certain legal
rights and privileges."'14 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit upheld
mandatory cocaine testing of pregnant women if certain factors
indicating drug use were present and possible prosecution if the
woman did not obtain treatment. 15 The problems arise when
considering the mother's rights weighed against the fetus'
"rights," if a fetus has rights, or against the state's interest in
protecting a viable fetus. In addition, as medical technology ad-
vances, fetuses will be considered viable at an earlier stage, thus
allowing the state to assert an interest in protecting the fetus at
an earlier stage in pregnancy.
"Maternal-fetal conflict is a term used to identify those
situations in which there is a discordance between the interests
of a pregnant woman and the fetus she is carrying."' 6 The con-
flict is created by: the independent interests of the mother and
the fetus, the obligations (if any) that are attached to pregnancy,
and the state's desire to intervene if the woman's actions do or
may create a risk to the fetus.1 7
There are many examples of situations that create a mater-
nal-fetal conflict. For example, if a woman decides to have an
abortion, she is determining that she owes no duty to her fetus,
and that her interests outweigh those of potential life. Medical
regimen during pregnancy is now thought to be as effective in reducing perinatal HIV
transmission as the longer treatment.
SSee Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).
14 Id. at 779.
15 See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd and
remanded, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) (holding state's mandatory urine testing for co-
caine in pregnant women did not violate the 4th Amendment); see also infra notes
39-41 and accompanying text.
16 Linda Farber Post, Bioethical Considerations of Maternal-Fetal Issues, 24
FORDHAM URa. L.J. 757,758 (1997).
17 See id.
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treatment is another example of the maternal-fetal conflict. An
adult, if competent, can refuse medical treatment. However,
some courts have overridden a woman's refusal of treatment
and ordered it for the benefit of her fetus;' 8 framing the contro-
versy "in terms of two issues: '(1) what constitutes a risk of
harm to the fetus that is sufficiently grave to justify limitation
of the woman's liberty, and (2) what constitutes a legitimate
reason for the woman not to take appropriate steps to prevent
harm." ' 19 The conflict between whose rights are greater, the fe-
tus' (or the state's interest in protecting a viable fetus) or the
woman's, have created the question of what is a compelling
state interest in promoting fetal rights over a woman's rights?
20
The maternal-fetal conflict has a direct impact on manda-
tory HIV testing. The fetal rights advocates would argue for
mandatory HIV testing to reduce the likelihood of perinatal
transmission. However, the woman's rights clash with the fetus'
"right" to not contract HIV, or at least the state's interest in
having healthy children born. The woman has a privacy right
and a right to refuse medical treatment (here AZT treatment). In
addition, she has a Fourth Amendment right to bodily integrity
and to not be subjected to an unreasonable search and seizure.
Finally, she has a right to equal protection, to not be singled out
and tested merely because she is pregnant and a woman. 1
1s See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457
(Ga. 1981) (allowing forced cesarean section to save life of fetus despite mother's
refusal); Raleigh Fitldn-Paul Morgan Mem'l Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J.
1964) (finding blood transfusion necessary to save life of fetus, despite mother's
refusal to consent based on her beliefs as a Jehovah's witness); In re Jamaica Hosp.,
491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (allowing forced blood transfusion to save a not
yet viable fetus, despite mother's refusal).
19 Post, supra note 16, at 765 (quoting TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & LERoY
WALTERS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BioEmIcs 276 (4th ed. 1994)).20 See id.
21 Each of these rights will be examined at length in the next section.
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I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS
FOR AND AGAINST MANDATORY HIV
TESTING OF PREGNANT WOMEN
A. Privacy Rights and How Mandatory HIV Testing
Can Pass the Test
The right to privacy, or as Justice Brandeis termed it, the
"right to be let alone" 22 is not explicitly found in the Constitu-
tion. Rather, it stems from the "penumbra" of rights in the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, and is recognized
as the right to make personal decisions.23 The Supreme Court
has extended these rights "to include marriage, procreation,
contraception, relationships, child rearing, and education....24
When a state attempts to intrude into one of these areas, the
courts examine the intrusion using the strict scrutiny test,
meaning the state must show it has a compelling interest and is
using narrowly tailored (or the least restrictive) means to
achieve that interest. 25 In Roe v. Wade,26 the Court found that
the state did not have a compelling interest in protecting a fetus
prior to viability, but restricted a woman's right to have an
abortion at the time of viability of the fetus. The Court found
that once a fetus could live on its own outside of its mother's
womb, the state could then assert a compelling interest in pro-
tecting it.28 Roe seemed to be a benchmark in recognizing a
woman's rights over her unborn fetus. However, any restric-
tions of the woman's right might lead the Court to find manda-
tory HIV testing to be permissible.
22 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (calling this right "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued V civilized men").
See Jennifer Brown, A Troublesome Maternal-Fetal Conflict: Legal, Ethi-
cal, and Social Issues Surrounding Mandatory AZT Treatment of HIV Positive Preg-
nant Women, 18 BUFF. PUB. INTEREST L.J. 67, 80 (2000) (quoting Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing marital privacy right from the penumbra
of rights)).
24Id. at 181.
25 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (finding a woman's right
to have abortion from Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). I am in-
tentionally limiting my discussion of the constitutional aspects to cases involving
pregnant women because these are most similar and most applicable to this discus-
sion.
26 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
27 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
2 8 See id. (defining viability as the pivotal point in the abortion debate).
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In Planned Parenthood v. Casey29 the Supreme Court fur-
ther restricted a woman's right to abort her fetus. Finding that a
state cannot restrict a woman's right to abort prior to viability,
the Supreme Court rejected the use of the strict scrutiny test,
instead analyzing the state's restrictions using the undue burden
test.30 The Court stated:
We reject the trimester framework, which we do not
consider to be part of the essential holding of Roe.. .The
trimester framework suffers from these basic flaws: in
its formulation it misconceives the nature of the preg-
nant woman's interest; and in practice it undervalues the
State's interest in potential life, as recognized in Roe.
31
The Supreme Court explained the undue burden test to be:
the appropriate means of reconciling the State's interest
with the woman's constitutionally protected lib-
erty .... [That] [t]o promote the State's profound interest
in potential life, throughout pregnancy the State may
take measures to ensure that the woman's choice is in-
formed, and measures designed to advance this interest
will not be invalidated as long as their purpose is to per-
suade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.
These measures must not be an undue burden on the
right.3 2
The undue burden test allowed the Court to uphold such
regulations as: a 24-hour waiting period before an abortion
could be performed, parental consent requirements for a minor,
requiring that a woman be told of the development of her fetus,
and reporting and recording requirements for statistical pur-
poses.
If the Supreme Court had used the strict scrutiny test, the
state would have had to prove that the law in Casey was neces-
sary to accomplish the end goal, and the government's purpose
in achieving that end would have to have been compelling. In
addition, the law must have used the least restrictive means to
29 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
30 See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 876-78.
"' Id. at 837.32 Id. at 876-78.
33 See id. at 881-901.
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achieve the goal.34 The burden of proof rests on the state, while
the undue burden test places the burden of proof on the plaintiff.
Although it is not exactly clear what the undue burden test is,35
by employing this less stringent test, the Court seemed "to be
saying that an undue burden exists only if there is a showing
that the regulation will keep someone from getting an abor-
tion' 36 before viability. The Court acknowledged the State's
"profound interest in potential life"37 and allowed the State to
ensure a woman's choice is informed, even if the purpose of the
information is to persuade her to choose childbirth over abor-
38tion.
Although the Court has not allowed a state to completely
prohibit a woman's right to have an abortion, it has permitted
states to restrict a woman's right. For example, the 24-hour
waiting period upheld in Casey assumes that a woman will not
have adequately considered her decision to have an abortion
before seeking one. The state assumed, in a paternalistic way,
that a woman was not capable of deciding what was best for her
without some outside help.
When a state or court determines at what point during a
pregnancy a woman is no longer able to obtain an abortion, it is
restricting a woman's right to choose. As states increase their
interest in protecting a viable fetus, the woman's ability to make
decisions for herself and her fetus decrease. An amplified state
interest increases the likelihood that the Supreme Court would
uphold mandatory HIV testing of pregnant women.
Although the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Ferguson v. City of Charleston,39 on the grounds
that law enforcement involvement negates a warrantless search
without consent, 40 the court did not determine that hospitals or
doctors could not test pregnant women for drug use. Rather, the
34 See ERwiN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITIrONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PouciEs
§ 6.5, at 416 (1997).
35 See Erin Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and the
New Rhetoric of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 AM. U.L. REv. 77, 144-45 (1995)
(examining abortion law and the impact of Casey on a woman's right to seek an
abortion).36 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 34, § 10.3.3.1, at 673.37 Id. at 672.
38 See id.
31 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001), rev'd, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469
(4th Cir. 1999).40 See Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1289-93.
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Court determined that "[t]he reasonable expectation of privacy
enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a
hospital is that the results of those tests will not be shared with
nonmedical personnel without her consent., 41 As long as law
enforcement is not involved with drug testing, then presumably
the hospitals can continue to test pregnant women.4 Both HIV
and illegal drug use, especially during pregnancy, can nega-
tively affect a fetus. But once the state has an interest in pro-
tecting the fetus from its mother's drug use, then the state can
argue it has an interest in protecting a fetus from all sorts of
diseases. Part of what is at issue is at what point the state can
assert such a profound interest in protecting human life.
The Supreme Court has already recogpiized a state interest
after viability by disallowing abortions in most instances. If the
state has an interest in not only ensuring that the child is born
alive, but also healthy, then the state, through its doctors, will
be able to test for illegal drug use, HIV, and other, less stigma-
tizing diseases and conditions. 43 Since the Court has consis-
tently allowed a state to assert an interest in the fetus, it is likely
to uphold drug testing (without the involvement of law en-
forcement), and in turn, HIV testing.
Those who argue that mandatory HIV testing is unconstitu-
tional might claim there is a difference between HIV testing and
drug testing of a pregnant woman. However, this is a distinction
without a difference. The argument can be made that a woman
who uses drugs will not learn anything new by having a drug
test during prenatal testing. However, a woman who discovers
she is HIV positive during pregnancy will learn new informa-
tion that could be very traumatic. While this argument is cor-
rect, a woman will not remain ignorant about her HIV status
forever. Once she or her child begins to show symptoms and
requires medical care, the woman will be forced to face her dis-
ease. If, however, she is notified during her pregnancy she in-
creases her fetus' chance to be born healthy. Counseling could
help decrease the trauma and teach the pregnant woman how to
41 Id. at 1288.
42 If, however, a hospital "undertake[s] to obtain such evidence from their
patients for the specific purpose of incriminating those patients, [it has] a special
obligation to make sure that the patients are fully informed about their constitutional
rights, as standards of knowing waiver require." Id. at 1292.
43 States are already permitted to test both pregnant women and the newborn
for various diseases. See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
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live with HIV as well as inform her of the advances in medical
technology that may one day find a cure for HIV. While HIV is
different from drug abuse or addiction, there are many other
potentially traumatic diseases a woman could find out she has
by submitting to a prenatal test. HIV should not be any different
simply because a woman is frightened to find out the results.
B. An Examination of HIV Testing Under the Fourth
Amendment Right to Bodily Integrity
The Fourth Amendment guarantees that "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated...."44 The Supreme Court has held that a blood test is a
search under the Fourth Amendment45 and thus it must be de-
termined if the test is reasonable. Since HIV testing is adminis-
tered by testing blood, it clearly falls under the Fourth Amend-
ment search. In determining if a warrantless or suspicionless
search is reasonable, courts have applied a special needs bal-
ancing test.46 The balancing test "balanc[es] the need to search
against the invasion which the search entails." 47 As long as a
special governmental need is advanced and the intrusion on pri-
vacy is minimal, then a court may uphold a special needs
search.48
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association,49 the
courts determined that the government had a legitimate interest
in conducting drug testing of railroad employees in order to
protect public safety. In Fosman v. State,50 the court found that
the government also had a legitimate interest in requiring HIV
testing of a man accused of sexual assault. These interests were
determined to outweigh the privacy rights of the railroad em-
44 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
45 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (holding blood
testing is considered a Fourth Amendment search).
46 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (finding state drug testing for
political candidates violated Fourth Amendment due to suspicionless searches); see
also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding
drug testing of railroad employees under special needs test).
47 Fosman v. State, 664 So. 2d 1163, 1165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (citing
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (upholding forced HIV testing of
defendant charged with sexual battery when victim requested such testing).
48 See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 314.
49 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
50 664 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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ployees and the charged (but not convicted) defendant. Courts
have also upheld mandatory HIV testing of firefighters and
paramedics under the special needs test, claiming that the state's
interest in preserving the safety' of its citizens outweighs the
privacy rights of the public employees. 5'
The Supreme Court would likely find that a state has a le-
gitimate interest in protecting its citizens from HIV infection,
especially its newest citizens. The state has an interest in pro-
tecting a viable fetus from death regardless of when the im-
pending death would occur, for example, before birth, or within
a few years from HIV. While the pregnant mother has a privacy
right in choosing to be tested, her privacy is not absolute. Once
a woman seeks prenatal care, she submits to a variety of tests,
such as mandatory syphilis testing52 and now possibly drug
testing, as long as the threat of prosecution is not tied to treat-
ment. Mandatory syphilis testing began in pregnant women in
1916 after a fatal outbreak of syphilis in the early 1900s and
discovery of perinatal transmission. Currently, 45 states still
mandate syphilis testing as part of prenatal testing.54 Ohio also
mandates gonorrhea testing of pregnant women.55 Despite man-
dated gonorrhea and syphilis testing, "research has not uncov-
ered a single reported case, in any state or federal jurisdiction,
where the authority of the state to require these tests has even
been questioned., 56 Other states require a hepatitis B test,57 ru-
bella, measles, tetanus, and chlamydia, as well as mandatory
newborn tests such as: PKU (metabolic disease that can cause
retardation), galactosemia (enzyme deficiency), homocystinuria
51 See Kellie E. Lagitch, Note, Mandatory HIV Testing: An Orwellian Propo-
sition, 72 ST. JOHN's L. Rnv. 103, 123 (1998) (citing Anonymous Fireman v. City of
Willoughby, 779 F. Supp. 402, 408, 418 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (holding that firefighters
and paramedics are required to take an annual HIV test because of the high-risk na-
ture of their work)).
52 See Samantha Catherine Halem, Note, At What Cost?: An Argument
Against Mandatory AZT Treatment of HIV-Positive Pregnant Women, 32 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 491,496-97 (1997).53 See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001).
"4 See R. Curtis McNeil, Note, Prenatal Testing Under Ohio Revised Code
Section 3701.242: The Doctors' Dilemma and the State's Shame, 22 DAYTON L. REV.
301, 310 (1997) (arguing that HIV testing should be added to prenatal care).
55 See id.
56 Id.
57 See Doe v. Lai-Yet Lam, 268 A.D.2d 206, 206 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)
(finding that hospital's failure to notify mother of positive hepatitis B test was a
breach of duty to the fetus and the mother).
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(metabolic deficiency), hypothyroidism (thyroid deficiency),
and hemoglobinopathies (disease that can cause sickle-cell).58
These are prenatal tests that a woman cannot opt out of, despite
their possible stigmatizing effects.
When a woman seeks prenatal treatment, she is consenting
to be tested for what is mandated by the state in which she is
seeking treatment. She submits to testing and treatment. "With
such broad and unquestioned approval of testing of pregnant
women for sexually transmitted diseases, 59 it is likely that the
Supreme Court would treat HIV testing as any other STD in this
instance. In addition, since the state has an interest in not only
protecting a viable fetus, but also in preventing the spread of
sexually transmitted diseases, the Court would uphold testing as
fulfilling a special need of the state.6° The Supreme Court is
likely to uphold mandatory HIV testing of pregnant women on a
Fourth Amendment challenge.
C. Can Mandatory HIV Testing Survive
an Equal Protection Challenge?
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from imple-
menting laws that deny citizens equal protection. 61 While some
might argue that mandatory HIV testing of pregnant women
violates the equal protection clause since only pregnant women
would be force-tested, and not the father of the fetus, this argu-
ment is also likely to fail a Supreme Court analysis.
58 See McNeil, supra note 54, at 309 & n.53.
59 1d. at 310.
6 0 The Supreme Court's holding in Ferguson v. City of Charleston may guide
how the Court responds to mandatory HIV testing. The Court, in Ferguson, objected
to the involvement of the police in the drug testing and treatment of pregnant women.
121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001). However, since an HIV test result cannot be turned over to
police, nor used in the prosecution of a woman, the Court would revert to the special
needs test. As the Court pointed out in Ferguson:
While the ultimate goal of the program may well have been to get the
women in question into substance abuse treatment and off of drugs, the
immediate objective of the searches was to generate evidence for law en-
forcement purposes in order to reach that goal. The threat of law enforce-
ment may ultimately have been intended as a means to an end, but the di-
rect and primary purpose of [the hospital's] policy was to ensure the use of
those means. In our opinion, this distinction is critical.
Id. at 1291 (citations omitted).
61 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, §1.
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Congress determined that employment discrimination
against pregnant women must be stopped and thus enacted the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act62 ("PDA") in 1978, which states:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" in-
clude, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis
of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions;
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all em-
ployment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work,
and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be
interpreted to permit otherwise. This subsection shall
not require an employer to pay for health insurance
benefits for abortion, except where the life of the mother
would be endangered if the fetus were carried to "term,
or except where medical complications have arisen from
an abortion: Provided, That nothing herein shall pre-
clude an employer from providing abortion benefits or
otherwise affect bargaining agreements in regard to
abortion.
The Supreme Court interpreted this to prohibit discrimination
against a pregnant woman solely because of her pregnancy.
63
However, the Court has only recognized pregnancy discrimina-
tion in employment cases and not in a forced medical treatment
case.
64
There are two levels of scrutiny for evaluating gender clas-
sifications. To withstand an intermediate scrutiny test, "[a] clas-
sification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to that object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
situated shall be treated alike."' 65 In Craig v. Boren,66 the Su-
62 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
63 See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669
(1983) (finding employee health insurance that provided a female worker's preg-
nancy with more benefits than a male worker's wife's pregnancy prohibited by the
PDA).
64 See Halem, supra note 52, at 523-24.
65 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Vir-
ginia, 253 U.S. 412,415 (1920)).
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preme Court held that gender classifications must serve an im-
portant governmental interest and the law must be substantially
related to that end.67 A challenge under this scrutiny forced a
woman "to prove that the state's objective could be better
achieved through less intrusive means, and that the program of
mandatory treatment offered by the state is not sufficiently tai-
lored to fulfill the state's goals.
However, since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has re-
examined gender classifications. In United States v. Virginia,
69
the Court indicated that a law must pass an "exceedingly per-
suasive' '7 test, a higher level of scrutiny. In addition, the "State
must show at least that the [challenged] classification serves
important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory
means employed are substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives" '71 for the law to be upheld. This is the test that
would be applied to an equal protection analysis of mandatory
HIV testing of pregnant women.
The important governmental objective that is involved with
mandatory HIV testing is protecting the viable fetus from death.
The state has a compelling interest in protecting the viable fetus
from an immediate death in abortion cases. This interest would
be extended to protect a viable fetus even when death was not
immediate, as in an abortion, but rather almost certain to occur
within a couple of years. The state would also argue that the
means (of testing only pregnant women) are substantially re-
lated to the achievement of those objectives. Since only the
mother and not the father can directly transmit the disease to the
fetus, the state's interest is in testing the mother. In addition,
since only the mother can reduce the transmission rate to the
fetus (by taking AZT), the state's interest in protecting the fetus
lies only in the mother. If the father could directly transmit or
reduce the rate of transmission to the fetus, then the state's in-
terest in testing him would increase.
66 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that the gender-based Oklahoma law denied
18-20 year-old males equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment).
67 See id. at 197.
6 8 Halem, supra note 52, at 524.
69 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding the Virginia Military Institute policy of ex-
cluding women from enrolling violated the Equal Protection Clause).70 Id. at 533.
71 Id. (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724
(1982) (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
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There are two ways to prove gender classifications. First is
that the law is facially discriminatory; second is that the law is
facially neutral but has a discriminatory intent.72 The Virginia
law was facially discriminatory in that the Virginia Military In-
stitute excluded women from enrollment. In Nashville Gas
Company v. Satty,7 3 the Court determined that an employer's
policy of denying women their seniority upon return from ma-
ternity leave fit the second category of having a discriminatory
intent. In addition, the Court held that this policy violated Title
VII.
74
Mandatory HIV testing of pregnant women, if discrimina-
tory, is facially neutral but has a potentially discriminatory in-
tent. Testing serves an important governmental interest in pre-
venting perinatal transmission and protecting fetuses. The only
way to ensure that a pregnant woman does not transmit HIV to
her fetus is to: (1) determine the woman's serostatus;75 and (2)
administer AZT during the pregnancy, labor and for the baby's
first three days of life (or six weeks depending on which treat-
ment plan is used). In addition, the mother should not breast
feed. AZT is not a drug without side effects and if a woman
who is not HIV-positive takes the medication, it might cause
more harm than good to both her and the fetus. Unlike Satty,
mandatory testing would not punish a woman for becoming
pregnant or for being a woman; rather the state's interest lies in
protecting the fetus.
Although this argument is the one most likely to fail a con-
stitutional analysis, in recent years the Supreme Court has dem-
onstrated that it is willing to uphold a greater interest in pro-
tecting potential life.76 Therefore, the Court is likely to uphold
72 See CRmM INSKY, supra note 34, § 9.4.2, at 607.
73 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
74 See id. at 142 (stating that the employer's policy was facially neutral but
had discriminatory intent).
75 Serostatus is a person's HIV status, and refers to seroconversion or "the
development of detectable specific antibodies" in the blood as a result of HIV infec-
tion. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 1623.76 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Other federal
courts have followed and upheld abortion regulations. See, e.g., Greenville Women's
Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2000) (upholding state regulation of abor-
tions because it did not create undue burden on the right to obtain an abortion);
Planned Parenthood v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2000) (striking down state law
which prohibited partial birth abortions because the statute was unconstitutionally
vague, creating an undue burden on the right to get an abortion).
HEALTH MATRIX
HIV testing of pregnant women despite an equal protection ar-
gument.
IV. STATE PLANS IMPLEMENTING HIV
TESTING AS PART OF PRENATAL CARE
Doctors and medical associations recognize the medical
importance of a pregnant woman knowing her HIV status. Over
the last few years, various medical associations have endorsed
prenatal HIV testing and all states have included HIV testing in
their prenatal care. The most recent and controversial endorse-
ment came from the American Medical Association ("AMA")
who "supports the position that there should be mandatory HIV
testing of all pregnant women and newborns with counseling
and recommendations for appropriate treatment., 77 The AMA
also endorsed draft legislation, which would mandate HIV test-
ing of pregnant women.78 In addition, "the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) of the United States Public
Health Service and The American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG), together with the American Academy
of Pediatrics (AAP), have issued statements that recommend the
offering of HIV testing at the first pregnancy visit. ' 79 Finally,
the institute of Medicine has recommended "a nationwide pol-
icy of HIV testing during pregnancy (with right of refusal)." 8°
Only two states have followed the recommendations of the
AMA. Connecticut8 l has implemented mandatory HIV testing of
77 American Med. Ass'n, H-20.930 Counseling and Testing of Pregnant
Women for HIV, (visited Mar. 5, 2001) <http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/
pfLonline/pfLonline?fLn=browse&doc=poli... /H-20.925.htm>.
78 See Public Health Initiatives: HIV Prevention Act of 1999, Letter to Rep.
Tom Coburn, MD on his draft HIV legislation-September 9, 1999 (available at
http:llwww.ama-assn.orglamapub/article/4117-4304.html>) (writing on behalf of the
AMA to Rep. Cobum noting their intent to make a formal endorsement of the HIV
Prevention Act of 1997); see also Comprehensive HIV Prevention Act of 1997, H.R.
1219, 106th Cong. §§ 201-03 (1997) (proposed by Rep. Nancy Pelosi).
79 Richard M. Grimes et al., Legal Considerations in Screening Pregnant
Women for Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 180 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
259, 259 (1999) (citations omitted).
80 Committee on Pediatric AIDS, supra note 9, at 149.
81 See 1999 Conn. Pub. Acts 99-2 (Spec. Sess.) (requiring HIV testing to be
completed during prenatal testing and requiring, that if mother does not seek prenatal
care, HIV test must be performed on infant within 28 days of birth with the results
distributed to the mother within 48 hours of test administration).
[Vol. 11:659
2001] MANDATORY HIV TESTING OF PREGNANT WOMEN
pregnant women, and New York8 2 has implemented mandatory
HIV testing of all newborns. Research has indicated that these
states have not faced any challenges to their policies. Most
states have implemented programs where HIV testing is in-
cluded in prenatal testing; however, the woman can opt-out of
the testing. She must sign a waiver that she does not wish to
have an HIV test, and this is kept in her medical record.83 Some
others require that an examining doctor suggest that a pregnant
woman has an HIV test, but if she declines there is no require-
ment of a signed waiver. 84 Other states have implemented a
mandatory counseling session on HIV risks to a fetus and test-
ing (where a woman can opt out).85 The testing and counseling
appears to be successful, with most pregnant women tested
during prenatal care.
86
82 See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2500-f (McKinney Supp. 2001). This law
mandates all newborns be tested and the results given to the mother. Unfortunately
there are two problems with this law. First, there is an approximately 30 day lag be-
tween test administration and result distribution, during which that time the mother is
free to engage in any sort of behavior. See Post, supra note 16, at 772-73. Second,
although the law mandates testing for the newborn, this test is in essence a determi-
nation of the mother's serostatus. If a woman is HIV-positive and gives birth, her
newborn will be born with her HIV antibodies, and, as a result, the newborn will test
positive for HIV antibodies. Within 15-18 months of birth, 75% of these newborns
will develop their own antibodies, and no longer test HIV-positive since they did not
contract the virus from their mother. See id.
83 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 708 (2000) (requiring all pregnant
women seeking prenatal care to be tested for STDs; however, the women can opt-out
of testing by signing a waiver); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.31 (West 2000) (requiring
pregnant women to sign a waiver if they refuse an HIV test); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-
5-703(c) (Supp. 2000).
84 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 141A.4 (West Supp. 2000) (requiring the
distribution of HIV prevention literature to pregnant women); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§26:5C-16 (West 2000) (providing information on benefits, notification, and guide-
lines for HIV testing).
85 See Prenatal Discussion of HIV Testing and Maternal HIV Testing-14
States, 1996-1997,48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 401 (1999) (analyzing
data collected from 14 states participating in the Pregnancy Risk Assessment Moni-
toring System for HIV testing and counseling of pregnant women); see also KMA
Urges Routine Testing of All Pregnant Women, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEwswIRE, Sept.
21, 2000, at 1 (describing the benefits behind the Kentucky Medical Association's
resolution for HIV testing of all pregnant women); Halem, supra note 52, at 495-96.
86 See Prenatal Discussion of HIV Testing and Maternal HIV Testing-14
States, 1996-1997, supra note 85; see also Buchanan, supra note 7, at 166 (reporting
that studies have demonstrated that most women voluntarily consent to prenatal test-
ing if given the choice in addition to counseling and information); McMillion, supra
note 6, at 243.
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The Federal Government appears to have taken a stance in
favor of mandatory testing by enacting the Ryan White CARE
Act Amendments of 1996.87 This bill requires that by the year
2000,
[i]f the Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary
determines that mandatory testing has not become rou-
tine practice, each state will have eighteen months in
which to demonstrate one of the following or lose its
Ryan White CARE Act funds: (1) a fifty percent reduc-
tion in the rate of new AIDS cases resulting from peri-
natal transmission (comparing most recent data to 1993
data); (2) HIV testing of at least ninety-five percent of
the women who have received at least two prenatal vis-
its prior to thirty-four weeks gestation; (3) a program of
mandatory testing of all newborns whose mothers have
not undergone prenatal HIV testing. 88
This act virtually ensures that prenatal HIV testing will continue
to be routine, if not mandatory by mid-2002.
V. ANALOGOUS ARGUMENTS TO MANDATORY
TREATMENT FOR HIV-POSITIVE PREGNANT
WOMEN THAT STEM FROM THE STATE'S
POLICE AND PARENS PATRIAE POWER.8 9
Part of the problem with advocating mandatory HIV testing
of pregnant women is if it is mandated, then what? Would there
be mandatory treatment of pregnant women? If treatment is
mandated, who will pay for it, and will treatment continue for
the mother after the fetus is born? These questions must be an-
swered before mandatory testing is implemented nationwide.
87 Ryan White CARE Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-146, sec.
7(b), § 2625(c)(1)(E), 110 Stat. 1346, 1369 (1996), amended by Ryan White CARE
Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-345, sec. 212, § 2625(c), 114 Stat. 1319,
1340 (2000).
88 Theresa M. McGovern, Mandatory HIV Testing and Treating of Child-
Bearing Women: An Unnatural, Illegal, and Unsound Approach, 28 COLUM. HUM.
RTs. L. Rav. 469, 470 (1997) (citing to 42 U.S.C.A. § 300ff-34); see also Jim Wil-
liams, AIDS Policy and the Fight Against AIDS Discrimination, 15 N.Y.L. ScH. J.
HUM. RTs. 483, 501-02 (1999) (suggesting that the only way states can meet such a
high bar imposed by the government is to have mandatory newborn HIV testing).
89 Parens patriae power is the state acting in its capacity on behalf of a citizen
unable to care for himself; usually the state asserts this power to protect children. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1137 (7th ed. 1999).
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Although uncommon, courts have not shied away from
mandating treatment for pregnant women. When mandatory
treatment has been allowed for pregnant women, the courts of-
ten cite the Tenth Amendment "police powers," and the "parens
patriae" doctrine.
90
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." 91 This amendment gives
the states the power to protect the public health and welfare.
The state's police powers have been invoked to justify manda-
tory vaccinations, medical examinations, and even quaran-
tines.92 The Supreme Court in Jacobson v. Massachusetts93 up-
held a statute that mandated smallpox vaccinations for the pub-
lic health. The Court allowed a state to act to preserve public
health by "enact[ing] quarantine laws and 'health laws of every
description.' 94 The Court did limit state intervention to that
which has a "real or substantial relation" to a public health ob-
jective, the method of enforcement cannot be "a plain, palpable
invasion of rights," nor can the state go "far beyond what is rea-
sonably required for the safety of the public....
The Supreme Court in Prince v. Massachusetts96 acknowl-
edged a state's right to override a parent's decision to refuse
medical treatment for his or her child even though the treatment
conflicted with their religious beliefs. Recognizing that al-
though parents have a right to freedom of religion, the Court
determined that they do not have the "liberty to expose.. .the
child.. .to ill health." 97 Although courts have relied on this to
override a parent's refusal of medical treatment, they are di-
vided on whether this is constitutionally permissible when the
child's life is not in imminent danger, or if the treatment is not
likely to cure the condition.
98
90 See Lagitch, supra note 51, at 129 (discussing justification for the states'
authorityV to implement mandatory HIV testing of pregnant women).
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
92 See Halem, supra note 52, at 509.
9' 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
94Id. at 25.
95 Id. at 31, 28.
96 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding a state's power to control the conduct of
children as opposed to adults).97 Id. at 166-67 (quoting People v. Pierson, 68 N.E. 243 (1903)).
98 See Halem, supra note 52, at 513-14 (citing Suzanne Sangree, Control of
Childbearing by HIV Positive Women: Some Responses to Emerging Legal Policies,
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Relying on these powers, forty states still have laws that
allow for mandatory treatment of persons with tuberculosis 99 to
protect the greater public from becoming infected. There are
also cases of states mandating medical treatment for the protec-
tion of the fetus. In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hos-
pital Authority,1°° the Supreme Court of Georgia authorized a
doctor or hospital to force a pregnant woman to undergo a
forced cesarean section for the benefit of her viable fetus. The
hospital argued that there was a 99% certainty that the fetus
would not survive a vaginal birth and a 50% chance the woman
would not survive either. A cesarean section, the hospital ar-
gued, was almost certain to protect the lives of the fetus and the
mother. 0 1 The court concluded that the fetus was "a viable hu-
man being and entitled to the protection of the Juvenile Court
Code of Georgia." 10
2
The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Raleigh Fitkin-Paul
Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson1 0 3 allowed a viable fe-
tus to receive a blood transfusion against the wishes and consent
of the pregnant mother. The court determined that absent the
transfusion, both the mother and fetus would likely die during
the pregnancy.1°4 Holding that the fetus is entitled to state pro-
tection, the court found the state's interests in protecting the
fetus outweighed the mother's religious freedom to refuse such
treatment. 105
Similarly, the Supreme Court of New York, in In re Ja-
maica Hospital,'°6 allowed a non-viable fetus to receive a blood
transfusion despite its mother's refusal. The court determined
that "the state has a highly significant interest in protecting the
41 BuFF. L. REv. 309, 376-77 (1993)); see also Brown, supra note 23, at 90 (dis-
cussing the difficulty of predicting whether parens patriae would be sufficient for a
state to override a mother's consent in the case of HIV).
99 See Brown, supra note 23, at 88 (citing Lawrence 0. Gostin, Controlling
the Resurgent Tuberculosis Epidemic: A 50-State Survey of Tuberculosis Statutes and
Proposals for Reform, 269 JAMA 255 (1993)).
'lo 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981).
10' See id. at 458.
1021d. at 459.
103 201 A.2d 537 (N.J. 1964).
'04 See id. at 538.
o See id.
'06 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
678 [Vol. 11:659
20011 MANDATORY HIV TESTING OF PREGNANT WOMEN
life of a mid-term fetus, which outweighs the patient's right to
refuse a blood transfusion on religious grounds."
107
In addition, in Ferguson v. City of Charleston,0 8 the Fourth
Circuit upheld a state law that tested pregnant women- display-
ing signs of drug use and then mandated treatment or jail time.
The Supreme Court reversed because of the involvement of law
enforcement. However, Justice Kennedy pointed out, "[t]he be-
ginning point ought to be to acknowledge the legitimacy of the
State's interest in fetal life and of the grave risk to the life and
health of the fetus, and later the child, caused by cocaine inges-
tion." 1°9 While Roe v. Wade"0° and Casey v. Planned Parent-
hood"' initially recognized a state's interest in protecting a vi-
able fetus, by allowing South Carolina to conduct drug tests of
pregnant women, absent any police involvement, the State's in-
terest in protecting a fetus is furthered, not only prohibiting
abortions after viability, but also ensuring that a fetus is born
healthy and drug-free.
Once a woman is determined to be HIV-positive, the state
must then decide if treatment is the best course to prevent peri-
natal transmission. While the ACTG 076 Study found that AZT
administered during the pregnancy, labor and then for six weeks
after birth limited the rate of transmission, further testing has
shown still lower transmission rates, and has demonstrated that
a shorter AZT regimen is as effective." 2 The standard treatment
starts at week 28 of pregnancy and continues during the new-
born's first six weeks of life. New research, demonstrated in
developing countries, and reported by the National Institutes of
Health, has found that treatment beginning at 35 weeks of preg-
nancy and then continuing for three days after birth was as ef-
fective as the standard regimen. 114 In addition to being as effec-
107 Id. at 900.
'0o 186 F.3d 469 (1999), rev'd and remanded, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001).
109 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1294 (2001) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
t0 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
112 See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
1" See National Institute of Health, News Release, Shorter AZT Treatment
Reduces Mother to Child HIV Transmission as Well as Longer Treatment But for
Less Cost, (last modified Oct. 4, 2000) <http:llwww.nih.govlnewslpr/oct2OOO/nichd-





tive, it costs eight hundred dollars less than the longer treat-
ment. The longer treatment costs about $1000 U.S. dollars,
while the shorter regimen costs $200 U.S. dollars. 115 Perinatal
transmission can also be further reduced by cesarean section
and by not breast-feeding."
16
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates
that approximately $240 million is spent each year to care for
children inflicted with HIV."17 By curbing the transmission rate,
this cost would be reduced to $1,520,000 per year. This money
would decrease the money spent on treatment because it would
be used to stop perinatal transmission.
The Ryan White CARE Act was reauthorized on October
20, 2000, and it guaranteed "uninterrupted federal support for
medical services for low-income, uninsured and underinsured
people living with HIV disease."11 8 Many people living with
AIDS and HIV face discrimination in obtaining and keeping life
insurance and health insurance. 119 Congress is attempting to
deal with these problems by such measures as the Ryan White
CARE Act and the Kennedy-Kassebaum Health Coverage Act.
If a woman has insurance, then her insurance, under these two
new laws, should pay for prenatal testing for HIV120 and treat-
ment, if necessary.
115 See id.
116 See National Institute of Health, News Release, C-Sections Before Labor
and Rupture of Membranes Reduce the Risk of Maternal-Infant HIV Transmission by
Half, (last modified Jan. 28, 1999) <http:llwww.nih.govlnewslprljan99/nichd-
28.htm>.
117 See Lagitch, supra note 51, at 106 (explaining that the high public cost of
treating infants with HIV has prompted government officials to support mandatory
HIV testing of newborns).
118 San Francisco AIDS Foundation, An Overview of Key Changes to the Ryan
White CARE Act (last modified Nov. 2, 2000) <http:llwww.sfaf.orglpolicy/
key. changesrw.html>.
119 See Catherine Hanssens, One (Very) Small Step for Health Care Reform:
What Does the Kennedy-Kassebaum Health Coverage Act Mean for You? (last modi-
fied Spring/Summer 1997) <http:llwww.thebody.com/hanssenslreform.html> (stating
that with the availability of treatment comes the problems of access to insurance and
health care which are aggravated by discrimination). This act places limits "on pre-
existing conditions, and it expands both the availability and portability ... of health
insurance." Id. Many insurance companies pay for T-cell counts or other tests and
treatments. However, courts are increasingly on the side of the HIV-infected person
in insurance discrimination cases. See id.
120 Anonymous testing for HIV is usually free. See generally San Francisco
AIDS Foundation, supra note 118 (discussing modifications to the Ryan White
CARE Act).
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In addition, for women without insurance or lower-income
women, Medicaid may pay for prenatal care, including HIV
treatment to reduce the transmission rate. 121 All states increase
the Medicaid eligibility limits for pregnant women to provide
for prenatal care. Medicaid eligibility also continues for up to
90 days after delivery, thus covering the costs of AZT that
would need to be administered to the newborn. 122
The shorter regimen coupled with the fact that fetuses as
young as 23-24 weeks have survived outside of the womb'23
increase the likelihood that the states would be successful in
asserting an interest in protecting a fetus from perinatal trans-
mission of HIV. States have already upheld mandatory c-
sections and mandatory blood transfusions to protect the fetus.
These have simply laid the groundwork for mandatory HIV
testing and treatment of pregnant women. A cesarean section is
a very invasive procedure; however, courts have mandated that
a woman deliver her fetus that way.124 A regimen of AZT,
which consists of one pill taken five times a day, is much less
intrusive than a forced cesarean section.
VI. POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST
MANDATORY HIV TESTING OF
PREGNANT WOMEN
Although mandatory HIV testing of pregnant women would
likely be found constitutional by the current Supreme Court, it
is not necessarily the best way to curb perinatal transmission.
There are many issues that need to be considered before man-
datory HIV testing becomes the norm, such as: the risk that
women will not seek prenatal testing for fear of being subjected
to an HIV test, the likelihood of voluntary testing having equal
or greater success in perinatal reduction, and the risks associ-
ated with AZT.
First, will voluntary and routine testing curb the perinatal
spread of HIV? In 1998, 3.9% of all women who gave birth re-
121 See Health Care Financing Admin., supra note 12.
122 See id.
123 See E-mail from Dr. Karina Carlson, Pediatrician (Kansas City, Mo.), to
Dorian Stables [Eden] (Oct. 25, 2000) (on file with author) (discussing fetal sur-
vival).
124 See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d
457 (Ga. 1981).
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ceived late or no prenatal care. 125 Of these women, 8.8% were
teenagers. 126 In contrast, in 1993, 4.8% of pregnant women re-
ceived late or no prenatal care.127 While the trend to not seek
prenatal care is decreasing, forcing women to undergo manda-
tory testing (and possibly treatment) is likely to increase the rate
of those not seeking care.
The number of women diagnosed with AIDS increased by
63% between 1991 and 1995. The number of men diagnosed
during that same time period was only 12.8%.128 African-
American and Latina woman are much more likely to contract
HIV than Caucasian women. 129 These women are more likely to
be low-income who have historically been faced with coercion
regarding reproductive choices and are less likely to obtain pre-
natal care even without mandatory testing. 130 "Most experts also
agree that the threat of mandatory or involuntary HIV testing
and/or treatment will drive some women already mistrustful of
the health care system even further from care. The fear of im-
proper disclosure.. .is already a powerful disincentive to HIV
testing for many women at risk."' 3 ' The doctor-patient relation-
ship is based on trust and absent that, many women may not
seek prenatal counseling and HIV testing.
The Centers for Disease Control has issued guidelines rec-
ommending voluntary testing and counseling as opposed to
mandatory testing. 132 Such voluntary programs have proven ef-
125 See National Center for Health Statistics, Prenatal Care, (visited Mar. 5,
2001) <http:lwww.cdc.govlnchslfastatslprenatal.htm> (providing figures on pregnant
women's health care).
126 See id.
127 See Inaam A. Nakchbandi et al., A Decision Analysis of Mandatory Com-
pared With Voluntary HIV Testing in Pregnant Women, 128 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
760, 762 (1998) (finding voluntary HIV testing preferable over mandatory HIV test-
ing for pregnant women).
128 See Williams, supra note 88, at 494 (citing HIV Cases in Women May
Soar, ALBUQUERQUE J., Apr. 22, 1998, at C3).
129 See id. (summarizing previous reports from the Centers of Disease Control
and Prevention).
130 See Cooper, supra note 2, at 20-21.
131 McGovern, supra note 88, at 475 (discussing dangers inherent in manda-
tory testing).
132 See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Recommendations of the
U.S. Public Health Service Task Force on the Use of Zidovudine to Reduce Perinatal
Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, MORBIDrrY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP., Aug. 5, 1994, at 1, 7; see also American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Position
Statement on Prenatal and Newborn HIV Testing, (visited Oct. 3, 2000)
<http://www.aclu.orglissues/aids/newborn.html> (summarizing the similarities and
[Vol. 11:659
2001] MANDATORY HIV TESTING OF PREGNANT WOMEN ()3
fective. When offered testing and counseling 90% of pregnant
women accepted the test.'33 In an inner-city study in Harlem,
New York City, there was a 97% acceptance rate after counsel-
ing of the effects of HIV on a fetus and newborn. 34 Other major
cities, such as Chicago, Baltimore, and Atlanta, boast similar
statistics. 135 The majority of the patients at each hospital are
"overwhelmingly poor and African-American, women who
stereotypically-and falsely-are perceived as being 'non-
compliant' or 'difficult' patients. Yet, consent-to-testing rates
and rates of bringing HIV-positive children and their mothers
into care are consistently high. In other words, these programs
work."
136
However, when mandatory testing has been implemented,
people have fled the tests. For example, in the 1980s, Illinois
enacted a law requiring HIV testing of all people applying for
marriage licenses. During the two years of the law's existence
approximately 40,000 people left Illinois and got married in
other states. 37 Many opponents to mandatory HIV testing have
used the Illinois law to demonstrate that mandatory testing ac-
tually deters people from the very thing the legislators were
trying to encourage-HIV testing.
People in general, especially pregnant women, may seek to
not have an HIV test because of fear of discrimination and a
negative stigma attached to the disease. 138 Although it is now
widely known and accepted that HIV is not only a disease af-
flicting homosexuals or drug-users, there is still a negative
stigma attached to it. The lack of "access to care and services
for those who test positive, and continuing discrimination
differences between the ACLU recommendations and the aforementioned CDC pro-
posed guidelines); Grimes, supra note 79, at 259; Michael Saccente, Preventing
Perinatal HIV: Prenatal HIV Testing and Strategies to Reduce the Risk of Maternal-
Fetal HIV Transmission, J. ARK. MED. Soc'Y, June 2000, at 97 nn.11-12.
"' See Nakchbandi et al., supra note 127, at 762 (discussing an overwhelming
positive response to voluntary HIV testing observed in one study).
134 See id. (citing M.K. Lindsay et al., Determinants of Acceptance of Routine
Voluntary Human Immunodeficiency Virus Testing in an Inner-City Prenatal Popu-
lation, 78 OBSTETMCS & GYNECOLOGY 678 (1991)).
135 See Cooper, supra note 2, at 22.
136 Id.
137 See Robert Endstad, AIDS Test Has 40,000 Fleeing State to Wed, CI.
TRIB., Jan. 4, 1989, at Cl (discussing Illinois' mandatory pre-marital HIV testing
program).
138 See Cooper, supra note 2, at 21.
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against people (and their families) with HIV"'139 may also deter
a pregnant woman from wanting an HIV test. However, coun-
seling and information has been shown to encourage women to
get an HIV test.
Voluntary testing is not going to magically stop all perina-
tal transmission, despite its previous successes. The Institute of
Medicine has acknowledged several barriers to achieving full
universal counseling and testing of pregnant women:
" Financial and other access barriers for women seeking pre-
natal care;
" Time and other constraints that may discourage providers
from counseling women appropriately about HIV disease
and the importance of testing;
* Language and cultural barriers at prenatal care sites that
may cause women to refuse testing;
* Financial and logistical problems that may make testing and
treatment difficult. 140
Without focusing on eliminating these barriers, even universal
and voluntary testing is not going to be completely successful in
its goals.
There are other concerns besides a woman not seeking pre-
natal care if there is mandatory HIV testing. In particular, if
mandatory HIV testing does become the norm, will mandatory
treatment follow? If it does, how will it be enforced? In the
cases of tuberculosis, an infected patient was subjected to man-
datory treatment by quarantine. Quarantining a pregnant woman
from potentially her 28th until six weeks after the baby is born,
or the 35th week until three days after birth (depending on
which regimen is used) seems a little excessive. In addition, it
would be extremely expensive. It is also hard to justify since
tuberculosis is airborne, while HIV is only transmittable
through an exchange of bodily fluids. The fetus, once born, is
unlikely to engage in behavior that will cause another to con-
tract the disease. It seems much more reasonable to encourage a
woman to seek both testing and treatment, rather than force her
to comply with both.
139 Id.
140 Project Inform, Striking a Balance: HIV Testing for Pregnant Women and
Newborns, PERSPECTIVE (Aug. 2000) <http://www.thebody.com/pinf/aug0/
testing.html>.
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In addition to the constitutional and ethical attacks on man-
datory testing, there may also be problems with the treatment
itself. AZT is not a completely risk-free drug and can pose risks
to the mother. Patients develop an immunity to AZT over time
and thus "physicians often recommend that AZT treatment be
initiated only when medically necessary.. .requiring AZT treat-
ment during pregnancy could cost a woman valuable years of.
her own life."'' 41 In addition, it forces a woman to take five daily
doses of the drug, which can cause such side effects as: "bone
marrow suppression, malaise, nausea, headaches, and occa-
sional seizures. Known long-term side effects include AZT
toxicity, cancer, and damage to the reproductive system." 142
While AZT has not been shown to cause deformation, prema-
ture birth, or fetal distress, there are few studies examining the
effects on the fetus. 143 One possible side effect is anemia, but it
has been determined to be mild.144 Other studies have "indicated
that children exposed to AZT were 8.4 times more likely to de-
velop a heart muscle disease than children who had never taken
AZT ...." In addition, the National Cancer Institute recently
studied the effects of AZT on pregnant mice. 
146
The study found an increased cancer rate among the off-
spring of the mice treated with AZT, including an eight
fold increased risk of lung cancer in males. Seventeen
percent of the female mice developed rare reproductive
tumors, similar to those caused by the controversial
drug DES that women once took to prevent miscar-
riages.147
141 Halem, supra note 52, at 508.
142 Id. at 494 (citations omitted).
143 See id. at 495.
144 See McNeil, supra note 54, at 314 (citing Centers for Disease Control &
Prevention, U.S. Dept. of Health & Hum. Servs., U.S. Public Health Service Recom-
mendations for Human Immunodeficiency Virus Counseling and Voluntary Testing
for Pregnant Women, 44 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 3, 4 (1995)).
145 McGovern, supra note 88, at 481 (discussing use of AZT by expectant
mothers and effects on offspring).
146 See id.; see also Nakchbandi et al., supra note 127, at 766.
147 McGovern, supra note 88, at 481 (discussing research on mice linking
AZT use with cancer). Note, however, that tests done on mice involved longer AZT
treatment. It is unclear how the risks to the mother or the fetus change with the
shorter regimen.
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This study only calls attention to the lack of knowledge about
the long-term effects of AZT when administered in utero14 8 and
suggests that before this treatment becomes mandatory, more
studies should be devoted to examining the long-term conse-
quences. A choice between cancer or heart disease and HIV is
hardly a choice at all.
VII. CONCLUSION-WHAT DO WE DO NOW?
This topic evokes many feelings of sympathy and a desire
to prevent innocent children from contracting the virus, in addi-
tion to concern over the effects of the possibility of mandatory
HIV testing of pregnant women. Despite surviving a constitu-
tional attack, mandatory HIV testing or treatment of pregnant
women is not the most effective way to curb perinatal transmis-
sion. Studies have shown that universal counseling and volun-
tary testing are the most effective ways to increase prenatal HIV
testing and treatment. The best way to help the children is to
encourage their mothers to obtain proper prenatal care, includ-
ing HIV testing. Mandatory HIV testing is not the answer to the
outbreak of HIV among children and pregnant women.
148 See Nakchbandi et al., supra note 127, at 766 (emphasizing uncertainty
with regard to effects of in utero exposure to AZT).
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